

TOWARD SOCIOANALYSIS

The "Traumatic Kernel" of Psychoanalysis and
Neo-Bourdieuian Theory

Far from being hostile to psychoanalysis, [Pierre Bourdieu] reckoned that there was no fundamental difference between his conception of the unconscious and Freud's: "It's the same thing: confronted with the unconscious action of dispositions we notice resistances, displacements, repression, negations."

—VINCENT DE GAULEJAC, "DE L'INCONSCIENT CHEZ FREUD À L'INCONSCIENT SELON BOURDIEU"

In this chapter I explore the possibility of reconstructing Bourdieusian theory by bringing it into closer dialogue with psychoanalysis.¹ Bourdieu gestured repeatedly toward such a merger through his reliance on psychoanalytic terminology, ideas, and arguments, through his embrace of the idea of socioanalysis (*la socioanalyse*), and in discussions specifically on the topic (Bourdieu 1994a: xxvii).² Bourdieu's writing includes such concepts as the unconscious, misrecognition, projection, reality principle, libido, ego splitting, negation (*dénégation*), repression (*refoulement*), phallonnarcissism, compromise formation, and anamnesis.³ I suggest that Bourdieu's recurrent use of psychoanalytic concepts is more than just an "analogical usage of psychoanalytic notions within sociological research" (Fabiani 1984: 92). Bourdieu's core concepts can best be modeled as deep causal mechanisms (Bhaskar) by rethinking them along psychoanalytic lines. In doing so we are simultaneously moving from sociology to socioanalysis, moving toward a merging of disciplines.

One barrier to this project concerned Bourdieu's ambivalent relationship to psychoanalysis and his hostile comments about Jacques Lacan, the thinker whose ideas can, I submit, contribute the most to a rethinking of the core Bourdieusian concepts. Bourdieu's apparent rapprochement with Sigmund

Freud and certain ego-analytic traditions contrasts sharply with his studious avoidance of any open engagement with Lacan. Bourdieu's rare mentions of Lacan are derisive and distorted. In *The Rules of Art*, for example, he dismisses Lacan as a sort of intellectual punster engaging in "the intellectual play on words" (Bourdieu 1996a: 247). And while Bourdieu insists on Lacan's noble status and his "great importance in the [academic] field," he did not include him in his dataset for the correspondence analysis in *Homo Academicus*, because Lacan "did not hold an official position in the university." Whether the academic field, Bourdieu's ostensible object of analysis, is coterminous with the university field is a question Bourdieu does not address here. Bourdieu's exclusion of Lacan from the academic field is not only arbitrary but also a symbolic repetition of the "refusal to permit him to lecture at the Ecole Normale Supérieure" (Bourdieu 1988a: xxi).

Lacan also appears as the source of a joke originating with Lacan and repeated by Bourdieu on several occasions from 1975 through the 1990s, namely, the "distressed complaint of the Jew to his pal": "Why do you tell me you are going to Cracow so I'll believe you are going to Lvov, when you really are going to Cracow?" According to Bourdieu, this linguistic subterfuge was used by Martin Heidegger "to encourage the belief, by proclaiming what he is really doing, that he is not really doing what he has always done" (Lacan 2002: 164).⁴ What Bourdieu does not seem to realize is that he himself may be discussing Lacan repeatedly, obsessively, in order to encourage the belief that he is not really talking about Lacan, not really presenting a theory that makes better sense when it is reconstructed on a psychoanalytic basis. For I contend that Lacan is the key to reconstructing two of Bourdieu's most important concepts, concepts that will remain mysterious and unfinished until their psychic foundations are filled in: symbolic capital and habitus.⁵

Many of Bourdieu's formulations during the 1980s and 1990s could be drawn directly from Freud or Lacan, although they are often hedged about with a *cordon sanitaire* of Bourdieu's own coinages. Bourdieu writes in *Language and Symbolic Power*, for example, that "in all cases of camouflage through form . . . the tabooed meanings . . . remain misrecognized in practice; though present as substance they are absent as form, like a face hidden in the bush. The role of this kind of expression is to mask the primitive experiences of the social world and the social phantasms which are its source, as much as to reveal them" (Bourdieu 1991: 142–43). *Phantasie* (or fantasy) is a core concept of Freud and is even more central for Lacan, as is the concept of camouflage (Heath 1986; Riviere 1986).⁶ Several years later, in *The Rules of Art*, Bourdieu writes, "What indeed is this discourse which speaks of the social or psychological world *as if it did not speak of it*; which *cannot speak* of this world except on condition that it

only speak of as if it did not speak of it, that is, in a *form* which performs, for the author and the reader, a *denegation* (in the Freudian sense of *Verneinung*) of what it expresses?" (Bourdieu 1996a: 3). Bourdieu also introduces at this moment the idea of the "social libido which varies with the social universes where it is engendered and which it sustains (*libido dominandi* in the field of power, *libido sciendi* in the scientific field, etc.)" (Bourdieu 1996a: 172). This opening to psychoanalysis becomes even more explicit in *The Weight of the World*, which declares sociology and psychoanalysis to be identical enterprises: "This is not the place to question the relation between the mode of exploring subjectivity proposed here and that practiced by psychoanalysis. But, at the very least, it is necessary to guard against thinking of these relationships as alternatives to each other. *Sociology does not claim to substitute its mode of explanation for that of psychoanalysis*; it is concerned only to construct differently certain givens that psychoanalysis also takes as its object" (Bourdieu 1999: 512, emphasis added). This book also contains the following passage, which is incomprehensible without its psychoanalytic foundations: "Such limitation of aspirations shows up in cases where the father has been very successful. . . . But it assumes all its force when the father occupies a dominated position . . . and is therefore inclined to be ambivalent about his son's success as well as about himself. . . . At one and the same time he says: be like me, act like me, but be different, go away. . . . He cannot want his son to identify with his own position and its dispositions, and yet all his behavior works continuously to produce that identification" (Bourdieu and Accardo 1999: 510). In psychoanalysis, the young boy's first symbolic identification is with the imago of the father, but the Oedipal structure makes this identification fundamentally impossible or at least contradictory: "There issues forth an impossible double command: to be like the father, but not to be like the father with respect to his sexual power" (Bryson 1994: 233). According to Freud, the relationship of superego to ego is not exhausted by the precept, "You *ought to be* like this (like your father)," but "also comprises the prohibition: 'You *may not be* like this (like your father)'" (Freud 1962: 34). Freud's analysis does in fact suggest the centrality of social class in generating psychic variations, for example, in his discussion of the "family romance" in which an older child's "imagination becomes engaged in the task of getting free from the parents of whom he now has a low opinion and of replacing them by others, who, as a rule, are of higher social standing" (Freud 1953: ix, 238–39). But Freud was less explicit than Bourdieu about the different conditions in which parents occupied "a dominated position" or were "very successful," and this is one of the reasons sociology needs to be integrated into psychoanalysis and vice versa.

Bourdieu's wide-ranging writings could be mined for any number of theoretical influences. Bourdieu relies heavily on the language of Marxism, for example, and he once described his field theory as a "generalized Marxism" (Bourdieu 1993c: 273, n. 7). But here, too, in the relation to Marxism, Bourdieu's work is marked by deep ambiguities as to whether he is fully embracing the Marxist definition of words like *capital* or the Marxist account of the labor theory of value (Calhoun 1993a; Desan 2010; Steinmetz 2009a). Cultural capital is not extracted via an exploitative process like the labor process in Marx. Cultural domination in Bourdieu is often a zero-sum game governed by monopolization of cultural capital, while capital accumulation is, for Marx, inherently expansive. Nonetheless, Bourdieu's core theoretical project of analyzing semiautonomous fields of practice and their irreducible stakes of competition and axes of recognition can stand alone, without these Marxian concepts, indeed as a generalized sociology of cultural, political, and scientific practice—one that finally takes seriously the neo-Marxist slogan of the relative autonomy of the so-called superstructures. But Bourdieu's theory cannot do without psychoanalysis, whose concepts go to the very heart of the sociologist's main concerns. Psychoanalytic theory is not so much an influence on Bourdieu as an essential component of his theory or, rather, of a reconstructed version of his theory.⁷

The entire sweep of Bourdieu's theory of subject formation is framed in terms of the internalization, incorporation, and embodiment of societal conditions and the reconstitution of those external conditions through the "regulated improvisations" of individual and collective practice.⁸ This model closely tracks the psychoanalytic interest in the individual's interiorization of social history (Freud) and incorporation into the symbolic order (Lacan). One of Bourdieu's more remarkable openings to the logic of psychoanalysis occurs in the section of *Pascalian Meditations* (2000b) in which he addresses the genesis of subjects who are suited to operate competitively in social fields. In a passage that tracks the shift in an individual's transition from self-love toward a "quite other object of investment" that "inculcate[s] the durable disposition to invest in the social game," Bourdieu works through a development described by Freud as the Oedipal story and by Lacan as the entry into the symbolic order:

Sociology and psychology [*sic*] should combine their efforts (but this would require them to overcome their mutual suspicion) to analyse the genesis of investment in a field of social relations, thus constituted as an object of investment and preoccupation, in which the child is increasingly implicated and which constitutes the paradigm and also the principle of investment in the social game. How does the transition, described by Freud, occur, leading

from a narcissistic organization of the libido, in which the child takes himself (or his own body) as an object of desire, to another state in which he orients himself towards another person, thus entering the world of “object relations,” in the forms of the original social microcosm and protagonists of the drama that is played out there? (Bourdieu 2000b: 166)

As we will see below, Bourdieu locates the motor of this shift in the “search for recognition,” a phrase that brings his interpretation even closer to the Lacanian/Žižekian reading of Freud through G. W. F. Hegel’s *Phenomenology*.

Bourdieu’s most explicit discussion of psychoanalysis occurs in *Masculine Domination* (Bourdieu 2001b). This is hardly surprising since the subject matter here is psychoanalytic home turf. Bourdieu acknowledges as much toward the end of the book, where he writes that “researchers, *almost always schooled in psychoanalysis*, discover, in the psychic experience of the men and women of today, processes, for the most part deeply buried, which, like the work needed to separate the boy from his mother or the symbolic effects of the sexual division of tasks and times in production and reproduction, are seen in the full light of day in ritual practices” (Bourdieu 2001b: 81–82). But Bourdieu begins this book with one of his characteristic defensive moves, categorizing psychoanalysis *tout court* as essentialist and dehistoricized—the same misleading criticisms that have often been launched at Bourdieu’s own approach (Bourdieu 1977: 92–93, 2001b: viii).⁹ With respect to the centrality of “sexual attributes and acts” in Kabyle society, Bourdieu notes that there is “a danger of misinterpreting their deep significance if one approaches them in terms of the category of the sexual itself,” a remark that appears to be targeting a naturalistic version of psychoanalysis (Bourdieu 2001b: 7). In fact, Lacan argues along lines that are quite compatible with Bourdieu’s antinaturalism that the “very delimitation of the ‘erogenous zone’ that the drive isolates from the function’s metabolism” is “the result of a cut”—a symbolic cut, that is—“that takes advantage of the anatomical characteristic of a margin or border.” The symbolic order, the order of language, is a system of differences; similarly, “the characteristic of being partial . . . is applicable not because these objects are part of a total object, which the body is assumed to be, but because they only partially represent the function that produces them” (Lacan 2002: 303). The terminology differs, but both writers reverse the doxic direction of causality between the biosexual and social orders.

Psychoanalytic theory has long been concerned with the problem Bourdieu sets out to explain here: the ways in which masculine domination is historically reproduced as an apparently dehistoricized form of practice. The meaning of the psychoanalytic expression “the unconscious does not have a

history,” like Louis Althusser’s formula “ideology has no history” (1971: 159), does not mean that the unconscious (or ideology) takes the same form everywhere or that it is eternal because it is determined by some permanent natural foundation. Instead, this formula underscores the ways in which the past is constantly being “actualized” within the unconscious through the mechanism Freud calls “the return of the repressed.” Likewise, for Bourdieu, the (masculine) habitus is, on the one hand, historical—a “product of all biographical experience”—while at the same time it presents itself in an *eternalized* form (Bourdieu 2001b, viii; Gaulejac 2004: 75). But once again, in his discussion of habitus, Bourdieu rejects the language of fantasy and the imaginary, warding off any serious mixing and mingling with psychoanalysis and insisting that “we are very far from the language of the ‘imaginary’ which is sometimes used nowadays” (Bourdieu 2000b: 171). In one particularly dogged example of never pronouncing those two accursed names, Bourdieu refers in his footnote to Cornelius Castoriadis rather than to the more obvious intertexts, Lacan’s writings on the imaginary, in which the term was first introduced and developed as a scientific concept, and Althusser’s use of the idea of the imaginary in his theory of ideology.¹⁰

Bourdieu also reveals his deep connections to psychoanalysis when he mentions in this text that he is relying on the Mediterranean cultural matrix for his model of masculine domination. Whereas Freud drew on ancient Greek myth, Bourdieu deploys Kabyle society as a “paradigmatic realization” of what he calls the “phallogocentric” tradition. From there, Bourdieu’s account takes on an increasingly psychoanalytic tone, interpreting masculine domination as being rooted in unconscious structures centered on “phallogocentrism.” Bourdieu notes that “the link (*asserted by psychoanalysis*) between phallus and *logos* is established” in Kabyle society (Bourdieu 2001b: 17, emphasis added). But Bourdieu does not make the obvious additional reference here to Lacan, who first developed the theory of the phallus-*logos* connection (Lacan 2002: 280). In Bourdieu’s discussion of the “somatization of the social relations of domination” in the creation of sexed bodies, the difference between Bourdieu and Freud almost disappears:

The work of symbolic construction is far more than a strictly *performative* operation of naming . . . it is brought about and culminates in a profound and durable transformation of bodies (and minds), that is to say, in and through a process of practical construction imposing a *differentiated definition* of the legitimate uses of the body, in particular sexual ones, which tends to exclude from the universe of the feasible and thinkable everything that marks membership of the other gender—and in particular all the

potentialities biologically implied in the “polymorphous perversity,” as Freud puts it, of every infant. (Bourdieu 2001b: 23)

Here Bourdieu takes for granted the ego-psychoanalytic notion of the denial of “the female part of the male” and “severing attachments to the mother” (Bourdieu 2001b: 26). Moreover, Bourdieu explicitly argues that male domination, rather than class domination, “constitutes the paradigm (and often the model and stake) of all domination” (Bourdieu 1990b: 30–31; Moi 1999: 289).

The word *socioanalysis* (*socioanalyse*), which points toward psychoanalysis (*psychoanalyse*) as its template, also appears in *Masculine Domination* (Bourdieu 2001b: 3). Bourdieu had already used this word in the 1960s but in a context of the sociology of knowledge rather than psychoanalysis (Bourdieu, Passeron, and Chamboredon 1968: 102). The word *socioanalyse* was used in 1983 by Bourdieu’s psychoanalytically oriented colleague Francine Muel-Dreyfus, who presented sociology as a “psychoanalysis of the social world” (Fabiani 1984a: 92; Muel-Dreyfus 1983). By the beginning of the 1990s Bourdieu was equating the word *socioanalysis* with efforts to reconcile psychoanalysis and sociology and praising “the great vigilance of certain recent attempts to advance in this direction,” especially in the work of Jacques Maitre (Bourdieu and Accardo 1999: 512, n. 7).¹¹

The word *socioanalysis* moves us away from disciplinary and scientific names based on *Logos* (sociology, and so forth), which suggest a unitary “word of God” (Johnson 1981: ix) approach to knowledge, and toward the word *analysis*, which suggests breaking up a complex topic, substance, or event into smaller parts. In this respect the idea of analysis is more compatible with the conjunctural, contingent, overdetermined approach to explanation recommended by Althusser and Roy Bhaskar and adopted explicitly by Bourdieu in *Homo Academicus* (Althusser 1979: 87–128; Bourdieu 1988: 173; Steinmetz 2011).

Despite Bourdieu’s rapprochement with psychoanalysis at the level of his language and occasionally at a more systematic theoretical level (a rapprochement he shares with his erstwhile critic Judith Butler [1997]) he never fully acknowledged its implications for his theoretical approach. Bourdieu protested somewhat feebly that he “would have needed a second life” (“il lui aurait fallu une deuxième vie”) to master psychoanalysis and that he told himself he wasn’t “up to the task” (“tu n’es pas à la hauteur”).¹² But this is unconvincing, since Bourdieu mastered one new field after the other throughout his life, working in areas typically associated with philosophy, anthropology, history, art history, and political science, as well as sociology.

Among the problems that psychoanalysis addresses in more satisfactory

ways than orthodox Bourdieusian theory are the following: the misrecognition of the social-real; the internalization of contradictory interpellations and their fragmentation (or potential integration into a unified habitus); the transformation of originally symbiotic subjects into agents equipped with the desire to compete in social fields, agents who can sublimate, in Freud's terms, or submit to the demands of the big Other in the field of the Symbolic, in Lacan's. Psychoanalysis offers a richer array of concepts for analyzing the idiosyncratic sense that individuals make of shared social conditions and the paradox of an unconscious agency.¹³ The relative autonomy of fields ultimately depends on the interest and ability of participants to orient themselves toward a field's autonomous logics and to resist being subjected to external forces and powers like the economy or the state. In this respect, sociological autonomy needs to be connected to psychic ego autonomy (Steinmetz 2009b).

Above all, Lacanian theory helps specify the core Bourdieusian concepts of symbolic capital and habitus. After discussing these two concepts I will turn briefly to Bourdieu's self-analysis, a text in which his proximity to psychoanalysis appears in sharp relief. This text also gestures toward the possibility of a transdisciplinary form of socioanalysis through an equal-sided synthesis of psychoanalysis and Bourdieusian sociology that would render both theories more adequate.

Symbolic Capital, Field Theory, and the Lacanian Symbolic

Lacanian theory allows us to reground Bourdieu's concept of symbolic capital in the symbolic order and in the related dynamics of recognition and misrecognition that are so central to symbolic identification. The symbolic, for Lacan, is the realm of language, difference, metonymy, and the law—the realm of socially sanctioned, official ego ideals. The relationship of the subject to the symbolic is thus a relation of “dependence on the Other, locus of signifiers” (Julien 1994: 167). Symbolic identifications are linked to the ego-ideal (*Ichideal*), which “constitutes a model to which the subject attempts to conform” (Laplanche and Pontalis 1974: 144). In Lacan's later writings, symbolic identification is understood more specifically as identification with the place from which we are observed, the location from which we “look at ourselves so that we appear to ourselves likeable, worthy of love” (Žižek 1989: 105). The “demand of the *Ichideal*,” according to Lacan, thus “takes up its place within the totality of the demands of the law” (Lacan 1988: 134).

The ego-ideal for Lacan is the “position of the subject within the symbolic, the norm that installs the subject within language” (Butler 1997). Subjects seek to recognize the normative injunctions of the symbolic order, and they seek to be recognized by those who issue these injunctions. This is recognition in

Hegel's sense, as *Anerkennen* or *Wiedererkennen*, rather than simply *Erkennen* (or knowledge). In his *Jena Realphilosophie*, analyzed trenchantly by Axel Honneth (1995), Hegel observes that "in recognition, the self ceases to be this individual" and that "Man is necessarily recognized and necessarily gives recognition . . . he is recognition" (Hegel and Rauch 1983: 111).

In *Pascalian Meditations* Bourdieu began to think systematically about the psycho-sociogenesis of the individual's capacity and desire to reorient itself from narcissistic to other-oriented practice as a precondition for the operation of the competitive field. But he never, to my knowledge, discussed the ironic relevance of the Lacanian Symbolic for his own analysis of "symbolic domination." Why did Bourdieu feel the need to complement his category of cultural capital with symbolic capital? Why this theoretical stuttering? None of his other categories take this doubled form. Other influences are named: Bourdieu refers to Émile Durkheim as a sociologist of symbolic forms and attributes to Ernst Cassirer the idea that symbolic form is the equivalent of forms of classification (Bourdieu 1991e: 164). In 1983 he defines *symbolic capital* as capital "insofar as it is represented, i.e., apprehended symbolically, in a relationship of knowledge" (Bourdieu 1986b [1983]: 255). This suggests that, at this early stage in Bourdieu's development of the concept, *symbolic* is simply another word for the semiotic. Several years later, however, Bourdieu noted that symbolic capital is "cultural capital which is acknowledged and *recognized* . . . in accordance with the categories of perception that it imposes," and "symbolic capital . . . is the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition" (Bourdieu 1990e: 135, 138). By the time he wrote *Pascalian Meditations*, Bourdieu had connected the topic of symbolic capital directly to the "search for recognition." As Bourdieu writes,

Absorbed in the love of others, the child can only discover others as such on condition that he discovers himself as a "subject" for whom there are "objects" whose particularity is that they can take him as their "object." In fact, he is continuously led to take the point of view of others on himself, to adopt their point of view so as to discover and evaluate in advance how he will be seen and defined by them. His being is being-perceived, condemned to be defined as it "really" is by the perceptions of others. . . . Symbolic capital enables forms of domination which imply dependence on those who can be dominated by it, since it only exists through the esteem, recognition, belief, credit, confidence of others. (Bourdieu 2000b: 166)

Bourdieu also seemed to make the crucial (Hegelian) observation that it is not only the dominated but also the dominant who depend on the "esteem,

recognition, belief, credit, confidence of others” (Bourdieu 2000b: 166). In Hegel’s words, lord and bondsman “recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another” (Hegel 1967: 235). Symbolic capital, Bourdieu now argued, can be perpetuated only so long as it succeeds in generating a system of mutual interdependence in which all of the actors in a given field depend on recognition from all of the others, and grant recognition to all of the others, even if this is recognition of an inferior status. Along similar lines, we are told in *Masculine Domination* that manliness “is an eminently *relational* notion, constructed in front of and for other men,” in a kind of field of men (Bourdieu 2001b: 53). This formulation again suggests that both dominated and dominant depend on recognition.

For the most part, however, Bourdieu falls back on a populist political vision that prevents him from noticing that his own concept of symbolic capital requires a universalization of the desire for recognition to all actors in a given field. The dominated may develop a “taste for necessity,” preferring their own (dominated) tastes to those of the elite. At the same time, they recognize that the cultural capital of the dominant groups is more valuable or distinguished. Where this is not the case—where the dominated and dominant fail to mutually recognize shared definitions of distinction—there is an ongoing struggle over the “dominant principle of domination” (Bourdieu 1996b: 376). Fields can become unsettled; practices may fail altogether to cohere in fieldlike ways, existing “*hors-champ*” (outside of all fields).¹⁴

Lacan offers a solution to this problem. He borrows the notion of desire (*Begierde*) from Hegel, “who argued that desire was the ‘desire for another desire’” (Braungardt 1999). Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic capital is based on the premise of reciprocal demands for recognition by all actors in a field, recognition of the variable cultural positions, habituses and tastes, and recognition of their hierarchy. But why should the dominant partner in a hierarchical relation seek recognition from the subordinated other? The answer is that both dominant and dominated are subjects of an encompassing system that is itself structured around a hierarchical system; both are subject to the Symbolic order.

What we have, then, are two different axes of recognition and misrecognition. On the one hand there is the axis along which the Law confronts the “infinity of individuals.” Althusser, who reframed Lacan’s symbolic order as the system of ideology, described ideology as “specular, i.e., a mirror structure . . . the Absolute Subject occupies the unique place of the Centre, and interpellates around it the infinity of individuals into subjects in a double mirror-connexion such that it subjects the subjects to the Subject, while giving them . . . the Subject in which each subject can contemplate its own image”

(Althusser 1971: 180). Among the “infinity of individuals,” however, are diverse social classes and groups, each of which can “contemplate its own image” in the social mirror of the other classes and groups. The Symbolic order demands recognition from the subject and grants him a sliver of recognition in the guise of the policeman’s call: “Hey, you there!” (Althusser 1979: 174). The dominant and the dominated both demand recognition of their respective tastes and practices. These tastes and practices differ from and reciprocally implicate one another.

Recognition is also doubled by misrecognition, both with respect to the subject’s overarching relationship to the Symbolic Order and with respect to its relationship to other classes and groups in the social fields. This is a relation of misrecognition, insofar as the image offered up for the purposes of ego-formation and identification is always generated elsewhere, outside the subject, and it is always an inverted, reversed, or otherwise distorted representation of the real. This is a relation of misrecognition insofar as the dominated tend to embrace their own condition of domination, and insofar as the dominant believe that their tastes and practices are genuinely superior in an objective or absolute sense.

The desire among dominated groups for the approval of, or recognition by, those who dominate them is somewhat paradoxical, and neither Bourdieu nor Hegel really makes sense of this puzzle. Bourdieu called attention to the central role of *amor fati*, or the “taste for necessity,” in social reproduction. By failing to account for the genesis of *amor fati*, however, Bourdieu runs the risk of a kind of social scientific functionalism. By contrast, psychoanalytic theory offers an account of the way in which the desire for submission emerges from the very genesis of the subject. It emphasizes the contradictory demand to be both like and unlike the father. Psychoanalysis offers a definition of the masochist as one who “locates enjoyment in the very agency of the Law which prohibits the access to enjoyment,” suggesting another account of this desire for recognition, one that is always controversial because it is so damaging to a different sort of *amour propre* (Žižek 1997).

Lacan’s theory of the symbolic order thus sketches out some of the micro-foundations or, better, the psychofoundations that underpin Bourdieusian fields and permit their operation by giving rise to subjects suited for working in a competitive but mutually recognizing manner. The subject’s ineluctable entry into the symbolic explains the desire to have his or her cultural capital recognized; it also explains why others have the capacity and motivation to classify that cultural capital. The “social libido” that Bourdieu invokes needs to be thematized within this wider theoretical framework.

Habitus and the Imaginary

The other key concept in the Bourdieusian theoretical lexicon is habitus. Bourdieu's notion of habitus has been praised for overcoming the mind-body and objectivity versus subjectivity distinctions that have been so deeply engrained in Western philosophy. The *integrative* power of habitus also makes it certainly important to Bourdieu's approach. Given the array of different social fields and spaces in which people operate and the historical layering of experiences and socializations, the ability of the habitus to integrate disparate experiences is a genuine achievement. By contrast, the idea of fragmented subjectivities in postmodern social theory does not do justice to the fact that many people do not suffer from a subjective sense of their own fragmentation or exhibit signs of disorientation or discontinuity, even though they are subjected to the same complex postmodern conditions as people who do feel fragmented. But while Bourdieu's concept of habitus is often mobilized to make sense of the seemingly mysterious integration of the disparate historical experiences that make up a biography, he also became increasingly interested in cases in which the habitus is internally contradictory, split, or unresolved.

Bourdieu introduced the word *habitus* when he was analyzing the subjectivity of the Algerian Kabyle, French colonial subjects, in order to explain a disjuncture between ingrained habit and the requirements of colonial economic modernity. There is little acknowledgment in his later writing on habitus that colonial ethnologists and sociologists had long dealt with this exact problem. Bourdieu was analyzing the subjectivity of colonial subjects who had been described for more than a century by Europeans as suffering from a kind of cultural schizophrenia or unstable code switching, a disunity of habitus (Steinmetz 2007b). French socioethnographers, including many of those to whom Bourdieu referred in his early writing on Algeria, had been theorizing cultural hybridity and transculturation among the colonized since the beginning of the twentieth century. The difference between describing the culture of the colonized as an unstable mix versus a stabilized integration of indigenous and European culture was at the core of practical discussions of alternative forms of colonial native policy and also within academic social science (Bastide 1958, 1970–71). Bourdieu's first comments on habitus thus stand in a long and evolving tradition of French and international ethnological research on colonized cultures subjected to foreign conquest.

Bourdieu's concept of habitus as durable and transposable dispositions came to encompass two opposing conceptions: a "permanent *discrepancy*

between the agents' economic dispositions and the economic world in which they had to act" versus the idea that habitus does in fact successfully update itself to meet changing requirements of the situation (Bourdieu 1979a: vii).¹⁵ Later Bourdieu added a third possibility, the idea of a cleft or divided habitus. Here he accounted for his own divided habitus by referring to the radical disjuncture between his social origins and his exalted position at the Collège de France (see below).

We could call these three main orientations of habitus the integrated, disjunctural, and split forms. As for the first, integrated form, we need to ask: how does the subject accomplish the task of integration? And why does it sometimes fail? Lacan and Freud provide crucial missing elements for the argument. Just as the Lacanian concept of the symbolic order makes sense of the subjective structures that underlie Bourdieu's fields, so the Lacanian concept of the Imaginary illuminates the curious capacity of the habitus to integrate disparate experiences and identifications so that practice usually does not appear to be disjointed. A cluster of linked concepts—mirror stage, bodily ego, plenitude, ideal ego, and imaginary identification—points toward a possible solution to this arduous problem of integration.

As noted above, the starting point for human subjects, according to Lacan, is not competitive aggressiveness (in contrast to the anthropological Hobbesianism of a thinker like Carl Schmitt), but symbiotic helplessness. Lacan postulates that the subject continues to experience a fragmented body image because of this early experience. Recurrent adult fantasies of the "body in pieces" harken back to this early experience, along the general lines of the "return of the repressed." Lacan discusses the production of a "succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body image to a form of its totality that [he calls] orthopaedic." As Kaja Silverman points out, Freud maintains that the ego is "first and foremost, a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity" (Silverman 1996: 1). As Lacan writes,

Whatever in man is loosened up, fragmented, anarchic, establishes its relation to his perceptions on a plane with a completely original tension. The image of the body is the principle of every unity he perceives in objects. . . . Because of this . . . all the objects of his world are always structured around the wandering shadow of his own ego. They will all have a fundamentally anthropomorphic character, even egomorphic we could say. Man's ideal unity, which is never attained as such and escapes him at every moment, is evoked at every moment in this perception. . . . The very image of man brings in here a mediation which is always imaginary, always problematic, and which is therefore never completely fulfilled. (Lacan 1991: 161)

Habitus in Bourdieu, like the psychoanalytic concept of a roughcast “bodily ego,” thus overcomes the body–mind split.

The key word in the last quotation from Lacan is *imaginary*. For Lacan the initial identifications that constitute the subject begin in the mirror phase, when the watery subject—the *hommelette*, or man-omelette—identifies with the totalizing and alienating external image of itself.¹⁶ The core structure of specular identity in the realm of the imaginary is this sense of plenitude and wholeness. Imaginary identification is identification with an image that Lacan (following Freud) calls the ideal-ego (*Idealich*), that is, an image “in which we appear likeable to ourselves . . . representing ‘what we would like to be’” (Žižek 1989: 105).¹⁷ The earliest imaginary identifications provide a template for later ones that are similarly characterized by a striving for wholeness.¹⁸ The notion of imaginary identification can be connected to the overarching psychoanalytic concept of fantasy, which has been used to great avail by theorists of nationalism, communism, totalitarianism, and postfascism. Fantasy scenarios express a conscious or unconscious wish. Imaginary identification is one site for such wishful scenarios (Inderbitzin and Levy 2001).¹⁹

Although Lacan initially restricted imaginary identifications to the mirror phase, in his later writing the imaginary was no longer a separate stage or realm but a dimension of subject-formation that persists throughout a life while coming under the sway of the symbolic order. As Althusser writes, the “imaginary. . . is stamped by the seal of . . . the symbolic” (Althusser 1971: 214). The imaginary is therefore as much a realm of signifiers as the symbolic. The symbolic order guides subjects toward specific images for imaginary identification, yet the subject continually slips from symbolic identifications back into imaginary ones. Although neither realm can be said to be fundamentally more estranged than the other, the imaginary offers forms of identifications that deny difference, estrangement, and the loss of symbiotic plenitude; they disavow their debt to the Other. The imaginary is a sort of estrangement from the subject’s “inevitable estrangement” (Weber 1991). There is a perpetual “oscillation of the subject” between ideal egos and ego ideals (Lagache 1961: 41).

We could therefore posit that the sense of embodied “ideal unity” expressed in bodily habitus is generated in the realm of the imaginary and imaginary identifications. Although, as noted, Bourdieu often erects a protective fence around psychoanalytic concepts, in this context he writes that, “Habitus of necessity operates as a *defence mechanism* against necessity” (Bourdieu 2000b: 232–33). This suggestion of a defense mechanism comes very close to the psychoanalytic ideas of fantasy and the ideal-ego: Imaginary identifications can be defenses against the grueling necessity of symbolic identifications, even as they fall inexorably under the latter’s dominion. And while these imaginary identi-

fications of the subject-body as a unified whole are just as much fantasies as the idea of the body in pieces, they provide the psychic conditions of possibility for a temporarily, apparently unified habitus.

As noted, Bourdieu introduced the idea of habitus in his work on French colonial subjects, the Algerian Kabyle. But he could not explain why some colonized subjects moved from a traditional to a modern habitus, while others retained or returned to more traditional identifications. Bourdieu suggested in the 1950s that the “economic world imported by colonization” was a completely modern, capitalist one (Bourdieu 1979a: 3). In the second edition of *Sociologie de l'Algérie* he included a new discussion of French land policy, which had produced a “*tabula rasa* of a civilization that could no longer be discussed except in the past tense” (Bourdieu 1961: 125). This perspective on colonialism overlooked the fact that in Algeria, as in other overseas colonial empires, modern colonizers often sought to strengthen indigenous modes of life rather than erase them. This policy of fortifying tradition was ubiquitous in modern European colonial empires and was known as “indirect rule” in the British Imperium and “associationism” in French colonial theory, and took the form of a kind of “salvage colonialism” in the German colonies in the Pacific and some African colonies (Steinmetz 2004; 2007b). It also underwrote forms of anthropology that prioritized the study of static indigenous cultures apparently untouched by external European conquest and rule. In practice European colonial rule manufactured a hierarchical plurality of symbolic orders within the colonies, for metropolitan civil servants, white settlers, and for each of the various tribes (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1969; Mamdani 1996).

The disjuncture between habitus and the demands of modern capitalism was thus much more than a cultural lag, as Bourdieu described it. The formulae Bourdieu uses to describe this disjuncture—the “hysteresis of habitus” and the “Don Quixote effect”—turn habitus into a memory of an earlier socio-historical formation that no longer exists. This mode of analysis tends to obscure the coexistence of diverse symbolic and social orders in colonies and in other social orders. A habitus that is out of sync with the demands of a dominant symbolic order may be perfectly adjusted to another, dominated order and may even constitute a form of resistance, a refusal to adopt new identifications that correspond to the demands of the dominant order. Since Bourdieu never fully analyzed the history of French colonial native policy in Algeria prior to the wartime interventions in the 1950s, he overlooked the ways in which the disjuncture between Kabyle and the new economic world may have reflected vital symbolic and imaginary identifications rather than passively reflecting vanished conditions. The “world in which [the colonized]

had to act” (Bourdieu 1979a: vii) was more than just a modern Europeanized economic world. Bourdieu did of course analyze the traditional world extensively, but he kept this part of his work separate from his texts on colonial destruction and displacement, producing, as it were, two separate Algerias (Martin-Criado 2008; Hammoudi 2009; Silverstein and Goodman 2009). If Bourdieu had brought the two projects together, he would have been able to argue that some forms of habitus that were obsolete from the standpoint of European and postcolonial policies of resettlement and proletarianization continued to be reinforced and ratified by subaltern symbolic systems and by systems originating in the “associationist” native policies of the colonial state itself.

The model I am proposing of a hierarchical plurality of symbolic orders is not unique to colonial or imperial contexts. There may also be a plurality of social spaces, to use Bourdieu’s terms, or Symbolic Orders (in the Lacanian sense) within a given territory and not just a plurality of fields.²⁰ The result of moving between symbolic orders and social spaces will usually be disjunctural or split forms of habitus, or forms of practice that appear clumsy or illegible. By contrast subjects are often able to move successfully among fields within a given social space, since social space corresponds to a given symbolic order.

What can we conclude from the forgoing discussion? We can define a *split* habitus as the product of sustained subject formation in two or more discrepant positions in a given social space or symbolic order. Bourdieu presents himself as an example of this in his auto-analysis. A disjunctural habitus, by contrast, suggests a more radically divided social condition, such as colonialism, in which there is more than one social space or symbolic order. The condition of “double consciousness” analyzed by W. E. B. Du Bois and many other colonial theorists points to this doubling of symbolic or social orders. Both the split and the disjunctural habitus can be distinguished from the run of the mill situation in which a modern person is active in more than one field within a single social space or symbolic order. In this unexceptional condition, habitus will be adjusted consciously and unconsciously to fit the demands of the new field, but the field-specific performances of a given subject will appear continuous and integrated.

The idea of a multiplicity of symbolic orders systems goes beyond Lacanian theory, of course, but it brings us back to sociology and history. Or perhaps this is the moment at which history, sociology, and psychoanalysis join forces to become historical socioanalysis. Bourdieu’s *Sketch for a Self-Analysis* resonates in many respects with psychoanalysis and is suggestive of a neo-Bourdieuian historical socioanalysis (Steinmetz 2009b). Just as Lacan

fills in some of the missing elements of Bourdieu's theory, Bourdieu shows in this text how sociology can complement psychoanalysis.

Bourdieu's *Sketch for a Self-Analysis*

This is a short book with a long, complicated history. It first took shape as Bourdieu's final public lecture at the Collège de France in March 2001. That lecture was published later that year as a forty-page concluding chapter entitled "Esquisse pour une auto-analyse" (Sketch for a Self-Analysis) in the book *Science de la science et réflexivité* (Bourdieu 2001c; Schultheis 2002: 114). In the final months of 2001 Bourdieu turned this chapter into a short book, which he decided to publish first in German translation. It appeared shortly after Bourdieu's death as *Ein soziologischer Selbstversuch* (Bourdieu 2002b). The French manuscript was then published in 2004 under the title of the final chapter of *Science de la science* (Bourdieu 2004c).

The first thing one notices about this book is that its title in both German and French resonates strongly with psychoanalysis.²¹ The most famous case of self-analysis (or *auto-analyse*) is Freud's; other renowned psychoanalysts, including Karen Horney, have written on the topic of self-analysis (Horney 1942). In a letter to Wilhelm Fliess, Freud wrote, "I can only analyze myself with the help of knowledge obtained objectively (like an outsider)."²² Bourdieu treated the idea of a "self-socio-analysis" in much the same terms. Similarly, Bourdieu elaborated the idea of "the *objectification of the subject of objectivation*, of the analyzing subject" (Bourdieu 2003a: 282). Freud concluded that self-analysis was a necessary complement to the training of psychoanalysis, though it could not replace it, since there were "definite limits to progress by this method" (Laplanche and Pontalis 1974: 413). Subsequent psychoanalytic theorists have agreed (Abraham and Jones 1927; Anzieu 1986: 303–11). Bourdieu did not comment on the specific obstacles to self-objectification and its methodological difference from the objectification of others.

After initially presenting his book as a self-analysis, Bourdieu quickly re-labels it a "self-socioanalysis" (*une auto-socioanalyse*) (Bourdieu 2004c: 11), the same phrase he and his coauthors Jean-Claude Chamboredon and Jean-Claude Passeron had used in the 1968 book *The Craft of Sociology* (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991: 74). Bourdieu announces his goal as one of retaining "all the features that are pertinent from the point of view of sociology, in other words, that are necessary for sociological explanation and understanding, and only those" (Bourdieu 2008b: 1). Attempting to present the text as something other than a self-psychoanalysis and as something other than an autobiography, Bourdieu does not begin with his childhood, his parents, or his ancestors. Instead, the narrative opens directly in the sociological, social-

symbolic thick of things: Bourdieu's years at the Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS). For Bourdieu the educational field takes precedence even over the family. "To understand is first to understand the field with which and against which one has been formed [*avec lequel et contre lequel on s'est fait*]. That is why, at the risk of surprising a reader who perhaps expects me to begin at the beginning, that is to say, by evoking my earliest years and the social universe of my childhood, I must, as a point of method, first examine the state of the field at the moment when I entered it, in the 1950s."²³ But it is not really obligatory for a psychoanalytic account (or an autobiography, for that matter) to begin at the beginning. Indeed, most psychoanalytic case studies begin with the symptoms that have brought the client to the analyst. Furthermore, psychoanalysis is one of the most narratively sophisticated of the human sciences, meaning that psychoanalytic writers often manipulate and hold in tension what the Russian formalists called story and plot.²⁴ The psychoanalytic process and the psychoanalytic case report do not take the form of stories told from beginning to end, with plot and story merging into a single identical linear path. Instead, these narratives are often marked by repeated, looping returns to different moments in the past as diverse memories are awakened in the present and new connections made across the timeline of the story. By the time Freud was analyzing Dora he had adopted the technique of letting the patient "choose the subject of the day's work," which meant that "the patient's story emerged piecemeal, in fragmented and disconnected form, with past and present interwoven, calling for new narrative strategies" (Lunbeck and Simon 2003: 13). The dislocation of plot and story in Bourdieu's autoanalysis is in this respect perfectly compatible with psychoanalysis and is indeed closer to the novelistic forms used by psychoanalysis than to the ostensibly nonnarrative forms of positivist sociology.

Following the strategies of denegation discussed above, Bourdieu oscillates between explicitly psychoanalytic and more narrowly sociological language. In the first section of the text he summarizes what he calls the "collective fantasy" (*fantasme collectif*) and "community of the unconsciousnesses" (*communauté des inconscients*) among the "scholarly aristocracy" at the ENS (Bourdieu 2004c: 19; 2008b: 7–8). The remainder of this first section seems to answer the question that concerns us but that Bourdieu's text has not explicitly asked concerning his relationship to psychoanalysis. In summarizing the state of the academic field at the ENS after the war, Bourdieu depicts the dominant pole as organized around Jean-Paul Sartre and existentialism and the dominated grouping as based initially among "marginal . . . authors, hidden from celebrity," but who nonetheless founded the history of philosophy and science: Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, and Alexandre Koyré. These

were philosophers with “lower-class or provincial origins, or brought up outside France and its academic traditions” (Bourdieu 2008b: 10). Bourdieu describes himself as being closest to this group, especially to Canguilhem, during his time at the ENS and after he passed the *agregation* (the highly competitive examination for positions in the public education system) (Bourdieu 2008b: 26–28). The dominated philosophical tradition represented by Bachelard, Canguilhem, and Koyré was completely dominant in Bourdieu’s main epistemological text from the 1960s, *The Craft of Sociology* (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991). This philosophical tendency, according to Bourdieu, gave rise to the “leaders of the anti-existentialist revolution in philosophy,” who were “more distant from the core of the academic tradition, such as Althusser, Foucault, and some others.” Bourdieu characterizes this group as developing a “philosophy without a subject,” and he reminds his readers that social scientists, Durkheim in particular, had made similar arguments a century earlier (Bourdieu 2004: 23). The problem with this account, for Bourdieu, is that it locates him in precisely the same social location in the French intellectual field as Bachelard and Althusser, who were deeply engaged with psychoanalysis, and by extension also with Lacan.

In response to this threat of contamination, Bourdieu’s text moves abruptly forward in time from the 1950s to the French intellectual field of the 1970s. Bourdieu now discerns a completely different axis of polarization, pitting sociology and the social sciences against a camp that includes Althusser, Foucault, and the other “nephews of Zarathustra” (Pinto 1995) along with psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis, Bourdieu now asserts, was allied in France with “spiritualism” and, “more precisely, with Catholicism,” and was situated “on the side of the most noble and pure intellectual activities.” Bourdieu harshly criticizes Lacan for combining “the obscurities and audacities of a [Stéphane] Mallarmé and of a Heidegger.” But this unconvincing denunciation cannot sharply separate Bourdieu from Freud, who was neither Catholic nor noble and whose writing style was crystalline and scientific, not obscure or audacious. Bachelard, one of Bourdieu’s earlier heroes, cannot be assimilated to obscurantism. Althusser can hardly be tarred with the brush of social class “nobility.” Moreover, in his dialogue with Jacques Maitre, Bourdieu embraced “a kind of social psychoanalysis” and argued “transgressively” that the interview itself is a “spiritual exercise.”²⁵

The next section of his auto-analysis moved back in time to the second half of the 1950s and the early 1960s, the time of his research in Algeria and his natal village in rural Béarn. According to Bourdieu, this “return to the origins” in Béarn was also a “*return of the repressed*, but a controlled one.” The

need to control the experience is owing to “the emotional atmosphere” and the “very painful” interviews he conducted there. As we know from Bourdieu’s publications on this period, his father often accompanied him in his work in Béarn, and “through his presence and his discreet intercession, helped [Bourdieu] to elicit trust and confidence” (Bourdieu 2004c: 82–83).

Bourdieu’s familial story—specifically, the relation to his father—is finally broached near the end of the *Sketch for a Self-Analysis*, when Bourdieu narrates his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France. Two psychoanalytic concepts structure this segment. The first is ambivalence. Bourdieu interprets his entire stance toward intellectual life under the heading of a “sense of ambivalence” rooted in the “lasting effect of a very strong discrepancy [*décalage*] between high academic consecration and humble social origins” (Bourdieu 2004c: 135, 127). In psychoanalysis, ambivalence points to “conflicts in which the positive and negative components of the emotional attitude are simultaneously in evidence and inseparable, and where they constitute a non-dialectical opposition which the subject, saying ‘yes’ and ‘no’ at the same time, is incapable of transcending” (Laplanche and Pontalis 1974: 28). As noted above, this is also where Bourdieu returns to the idea of a split or “cleft” habitus (*habitus clivé*). The second concept in this discussion is guilt. Bourdieu says that his lecture was accompanied by a “sense of guilt towards [his] father, who had just died in a particularly tragic way.” Bourdieu makes a “magical connection between his [father’s] death and a success [he] constructed as a transgression and a treachery” (Bourdieu 2004c: 138). Lacan might read the sense of guilt as intrinsic to the entrance into the symbolic order per se. A sense of guilt would be especially strong in the context of a challenge to that order (Butler 1997: 106–31). And, indeed, Bourdieu goes on to describe his lecture as a “challenge to the *symbolic order* [*un défi à l’ordre symbolique*]” (Bourdieu 2004c: 138; italics mine). It is worth noting the linguistic slippage from *space* to *order* in this context: Bourdieu’s more usual phrase was symbolic space (*espace symbolique*). Bourdieu’s entry into the Collège de France recalls for him the original traumatic entry into the symbolic order itself, the realm of official ego-ideals.

Toward Socioanalysis

My conclusion is that Lacanian psychoanalysis and Bourdieusian socioanalysis need one another. Bourdieu had already suggested the necessity of combining a sociological sense of lifelong transformations with a psychoanalytic account of the original constitution of the subject. In his interview with Maître he observed that psychoanalysis often stops “at the moment when the social begins to transform desire (*au moment où le social commence à travailler le désir.*)”

What is needed, Bourdieu argued, is a “theory of the socialization of the libido” (Bourdieu 1994a: xvii). As I have suggested here, what is also needed is a more thorough specification of the psychic underpinnings of the social.

Bourdieu argued that “sociology does not claim to substitute its mode of explanation for that of psychoanalysis; it is concerned only to construct differently certain givens that psychoanalysis also takes as its object” (Bourdieu 1999: 512). But social analysis requires an integration of the ontological levels of the psychic and the social (Bhaskar 1979). If Bourdieu had explored this relationship in more depth, he might have seen that they were not alternatives, but that psychoanalysis filled some of the lacunae in his own theoretical approach. Bourdieu’s signal contributions, including the concepts of habitus and symbolic capital, need to be reconstructed in dialogue with psychoanalytic theories of the imaginary integration of bodily imagery and symbolic recognition and misrecognition. Bourdieusian theory needs to specify its own psychofoundations, and it needs to select a version of psychic theory that best fits with its aspirations to remain on the side of antipositivism or nonpositivism. Bourdieu’s situationally determined reluctance to fully engage with the most powerful theorists of the psychic, such as Lacan, should not continue to afflict his followers.

Notes

1. The source of the epigraph is Gaulejac (2004). In a recent paper (Steinmetz 2009b) I examined the possibility of intergrating Bourdieu’s theory of scientific autonomy with the psychoanalytic theory of ego autonomy in order to better understand scientists’ susceptibility to heteronomization, that is, to aligning their research with extrascientific powers.
2. I am grateful to Françoise Muel-Dreyfus for bringing this article to my attention and for her critical comments on an earlier draft of my article.
3. Freud did not invent the term *unconscious*, but he gave it its distinctive contemporary definition (Rand 2004).
4. Bourdieu first refers to this story in his article of 1975 on Heidegger, expanded into Bourdieu 1991a. It appears again in Bourdieu 1991e: 146.
5. It follows that the third key Bourdieusian concept, *field*, also makes most sense when reconstructed along these lines. As I have argued elsewhere, fields cannot be understood solely as agonistic Kampfplätze but are also arenas of mutual identification, recognition, and even love (Steinmetz 2008). For a parallel effort to integrate Bourdieu’s theory with Lacanian psychoanalysis, see the important book by Hage (2000). I am grateful to Ghassan Hage for discussing some of the issues in this paper with me in Melbourne in August 2010. For an excellent but more orthodox reading of the idea of the unconscious in Bourdieu, see Chevallier and Chauviré (2010).
6. Contrary to Jean-François Fourny, there is no systematic Lacanian or Freudian

usage according to which *phantasy* or *phantasm* designates a collective and unconscious form while *fantasy* refers to a conscious one (Fourny 2000). Fourny's excellent article overlaps with my efforts to integrate Bourdieu and psychoanalysis; the main difference is that I argue that a more systematic integration of Lacan can strengthen Bourdieu's theory, and vice-versa, yielding a transdisciplinary, neo-Bourdieuian and neo-Lacanian "socioanalysis."

7. Bourdieu's relationship to psychoanalysis is both deeper and much more problematic than his relationship to nonpsychoanalytic psychologists; but see Lizardo's excellent article (2004) on the importance of Jean Piaget to Bourdieu's idea of habitus.
8. It is crucial to recognize that Bourdieu is not an ahistorical "reproduction theorist." Both social reproduction *and* social change, constraint *and* freedom, are at the core of Bourdieu's project. See Steinmetz (2011). The same is true of Freud, for whom two individuals confronted by the same Oedipal drama may make very different sense of it.
9. Here, psychoanalysis is reduced to a form of biological reductionism, ignoring Freud's shift from the theory of childhood abuse in the early *Studies in Hysteria* to the theory of sexual fantasy he developed in the course of his self-analysis. In *Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (1905) Freud insisted that the child's taking one or both of its parents as "the object of its erotic wishes" "usually follows some indication from the parents" rather than emerging quasi-naturally from a biological foundation. Freud also insisted on the "plasticity of the components of sexuality" (Freud 1977: 51, 61). For a more detailed discussion of the tension between biological and sociological modes of interpretation in Freud, see Elliott (2005). On the accusations against Bourdieu of antihistoricism, see Steinmetz (2011) and Gorski's introduction to this volume.
10. Castoriadis's original theory of the imaginary was developed in an act of theoretical suppression directed at Lacan, his former master theorist. See Stavrakakis (2002).
11. Bourdieu praised Maitre's efforts to specify the "relations between sociology and psychoanalysis." See Bourdieu 1994a.
12. Unattributed comment from the public, quoting a comment by Loïc Wacquant, in Corcuff (2004: 95). Second quote from Bourdieu (2003c: 29).
13. This will seem like a startling claim only to those who have restricted themselves to Freud's more schematic overviews of his theory or approached psychoanalysis through the work of hostile critics. But even the various case studies in Freud's earliest work on hysteria reveal an enormously wide array of symptoms among his women patients (Breuer, Freud, and Brill 1950). The distinction between the positive and negative Oedipus complex in Freud's mature theory points to different alternative paths that people can take in response to identical social predicaments. Indeed psychoanalysis emphasizes the infinitely creative nature of the unconscious and the huge variety of forms of psychosexual development. Freud's concept of *working through* "characterizes the role of the patient in analysis" and is concerned with "the labor of the patient" in recognizing and overcoming resistances—in other words, the conscious and unconscious agency of the subject. See Sedler (1983).

14. Comments by Lilian Mathieu in Corcuff (2004: 239). I discuss settled and unsettled fields in Steinmetz (2007a).
15. Wearing his “therapeutic” hat, Bourdieu also suggested that habitus could be deliberately remade through “repeated exercises . . . like an athlete’s training” (Bourdieu 2000b: 172).
16. This need not be a literal reflection in a mirror but can also be the image or even the voice of another human, perhaps a mother or caretaker (Silverman 1988).
17. See also Lacan (1988); Lagache (1961).
18. Freud already recognized that identifications need not involve explicitly erotic cathexes (Freud 1955).
19. See, in addition, the special issue of *La Psychanalyse* 8 (1964) entitled “Fantasme, Rêve, Réalité.”
20. Even within a given social space it is possible that habituses generated and reinforced within one field may be “discrepant” or ill-fitting when they are imported into other fields. There needs to be as much attention to discrepancies as to homologies among the fields in a given social space.
21. The German title has less explicitly psychoanalytic associations. A more accurate German translation of Bourdieu’s original title would have been something like *Umriss einer Selbstanalyse*.
22. Freud 1897: 271.
23. Bourdieu 2004c: 15.
24. The story, as Bordwell and Thompson (1979: 50) point out, is the “series of causal events as they occur in chronological order and presumed duration and frequency.” In most narratives, however, the “events are not presented in exact chronological order; the order in which they occur in the actual text is their *plot* order” (50). Bourdieu (1986a) was familiar with these narratological categories.
25. Bourdieu continues that he “always felt this,” that is, that the sociological interview is a spiritual exercise, but that he had been suffering from a “sort of positivist repression, . . . this form of masochism identified with professional virtue” (Bourdieu 1994a: v–xxii).